Radical Behaviourism and Humanistic Phenomenology Theories of Personality:
a Comparison and Critique

B.F. Skinner’s radical behaviourism, and Carl Rogers’s humanistic phenomenology are two of the most influential personality theories of the last century, and have made major contributions both to the science of psychology, and improving the human condition (Cervone & Pervin, 2016).

Conventional lore presents the theories as antithetical: behaviourism, proposing personality is entirely determined by environmental factors; and phenomenology proposing it is entirely determined by subjective factors.

This essay describes and compares both theories. Through a critical review both of historical and current literature it finds there are indeed many differences, and also similarities. It highlights the mistaken assumption of both theorists, born of their time, that determinism necessarily implies predictability of behaviour, and argues recent advances in science, particularly in the fields of nonlinear dynamics and behavioural genetics, present an opportunity to correct this mistaken assumption, and to consider the case for a more integrated comprehensive approach.

Radical Behaviourism: a brief description

Radical behaviourism is often misrepresented as ignoring subjective experiences of consciousness (Skinner, 1974). Skinner himself goes to great lengths to refute this, as do others on his behalf (Phelps, 2015; Sommerbeck, 2011; Debell & Harless, 1992). Radical behaviourism fiercely rejects dualism—the notion of a mind separate from the body—but in no way rejects the notion of a private inner-world. Skinner wrote extensively and explicitly on this topic, for example “The fact of privacy cannot, of course, be questioned. Each person is in special contact with a small part of the universe enclosed within his own skin” (Skinner, 1969, p.212); and he admonished as neglectful behaviourists who excluded consideration of this inner world.

To understand how behaviourism explains personality, a definition of behaviour is required. Behaviour is anything an organism does. It is the performance of an action or process, and need not involve physical movement: behaviour includes thinking, feeling and perceiving which are considered private behaviour (Perez-Alvarez & Sass, 2008). In the full context of this definition, personality includes private behaviour.

Conventional behaviourism, or methodological behaviourism, rejects these “inner, private behaviours” on the basis they cannot be observed, and therefore are of no use to a scientific method (Skinner, 1969; 1974). Radical behaviourism however grants private phenomena the same status as public, observable phenomena (Perez-Alvarez & Sass, 2008).

Much of psychology argues “personality” is composed of separate tendencies, or traits, which cause people to act in certain ways (Cervone & Pervin, 2016). For example; someone may behave narcissistically because they have a narcissistic personality. Some psychologists, including Skinner, reject this approach as a circular argument—the person behaves narcissistically because they have a tendency to be narcissistic—and counter that it does not serve to explain the cause of the narcissism (Phelps, 2015).

Radical behaviourism seeks to explain the cause. It posits all behaviour, including private behaviour, is a result of consequences, or ‘reinforcers’, learned in response to environmental stimuli. For example, I pull my hand away (response) from a hot stove (stimulus) because I have learnt that to leave it there would burn me (consequence). Behaviour that is rewarding tends to be repeated, behaviour that is punishing tends not to be (Cervone & Pervin, 2016).

Private behaviour is similarly explained: if I feel self-important and behave narcissistically, the former does not necessarily cause the latter. Indeed, I may feel self-important but not behave narcissistically—a separate behaviour. Rather “feeling self-important” is an inner private behaviour, learned in response to environmental stimuli—the things that have gone on, or are going on, in my world, which has both public and private domains. Understanding the relevant variables in those domains that cause behaviour, and manipulating them to elicit a different response, is key to effecting behaviour change.

From a radical behaviourist perspective, then, personality—“those characteristics of the person that account for consistent patterns of experience and action” (Cervone & Pervin, 2016, p.485) is behaviour. It is my unique set of genetics and experiences of similar situations in the past that dictate how I will act, think, and feel in a given situation in the future.

“An individual is unquestionably unique. No one else (unless he has an identical twin) has his genetic endowment, and without exception no one else has his personal history. Hence, no one else will behave in precisely the same way”. (Skinner, 1974, pp. 167-168)

Humanistic Phenomenology: a brief description

Rogers, like Skinner, rejected dualism but paradoxically also embraced free-will. He proposed the core of personality is “the organism itself”, and organisms are motivated to act, not by a series of situations, responses, and consequences as in behaviourism, but by an inherent tendency to “actualise”: to act in ways that serve to maintain and enhance oneself. According to Rogers (1959), this is the sole and only motive of organisms: his entire theory thus is developed on actualizing tendency (Ismail & Tekke, 2015).

The purpose of self-actualisation is to become a fully functioning person, whose characteristics include having a healthy “self-structure”, and being capable of living “the good life”, in which one has an absence of defensiveness and rigidity, awareness of self and openness to experience, adaptability and increasing trust in oneself, and an increasing tendency to live fully in each moment (Proctor, Tweed, & Morris, 2016).

Personality develops from infancy and throughout one’s lifetime, by learning to value experiences perceived as maintaining or enhancing oneself, and avoiding experiences perceived as not. A notable difference with behaviourism is that this “perception” regulates behaviour. If I perceive a situation is threatening, such as a hot stove, it is this perception that will cause me to avoid it, not the reality or, as behaviourists would put it, the “stimulus” (Rogers, 1961; 1959).

Phenomenology is very much built on a person’s concept of self, and ideal self—who I am and my subjective experience of reality, who I want to be and my journey towards self-actualisation. A large discrepancy between my concept of self and ideal-self can result in anxiety, distress, and psychopathological behaviours (Cervone & Pervin, 2016).

Two factors are crucial to development of self-concept: the need for positive regard of significant social others, and conditions of worth— literally what makes me feel “worthy”, which emerge from positive regard given or withheld by others. Need for positive regard can become so compelling that I behave counter to my self-actualising tendency. Similarly, conditions of worth can result in a self-concept at odds with my innate motivation to self-actualise, such that my self-structure becomes distorted (Rogers, 1961).

Experiences that are not consistent with self-structure (or that violate its incorporated conditions of worth) are perceived as threatening and are defended against by a process called subception: selective perception or distortion of the experience, or denial to the awareness of the experience or some portion of it (Rogers, 1961).

Phenomenology’s focus in the therapeutic setting is to correct the distorted self-concept and to bring it in closer alignment with the ideal-self. In this way the person would behave in a manner consistent with its innate tendency to actualise and would become “fully functioning” and “living the good life” (Rogers, 1959; Proctor, Tweed, & Morris, 2016)

Comparison of contributions, similarities and differences

Phenomenology is successfully applied to a diverse range of applications including: improving the experience of aging (Lacuelle & Baars, 2014); treatment of borderline personality disorder (Quinn, 2011), post-traumatic stress disorder (Quinn, 2008) and intergenerational trauma (Matz, Vogel, Mattar, & Montenegro, 2015), alcohol abuse (Babilonia, 2016), speech and other communication disorders (Lieberman, 2018); and increasing happiness and life satisfaction (Proctor, Tweed, & Morris, 2016).

Similarly, radical behaviourism has “been helping people to enhance the quality of their lives for decades” (Gambrill, 2013, p.123). Its contributions include treatment of autism, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), teaching, substance abuse, industrial problems and business, sleep problems, and gerontology (Madden, 2012; Johnson, Kohler, & Ross, 2017).

Clearly, a similarity of both theories is that they have each made significant contributions to psychological science and improvement of the human condition. Other similarities include: rejection of dualism; agreement that an inner world of subjective experience exists which guides, at least to some extent, behaviour; and this inner-world includes the concept of self (Rogers & Skinner, 1956); a preference for idiographic rather than nomothetic research; and taking practical life as their central theme (Perez-Alvarez & Sass, Phenomenology and Behaviorism: A Mutual Readjustment, 2008).

There are also marked differences. Drawing broadly from the literature, a summary is presented below.

 

Limitations and Convergence

Limitations of phenomenology include that it is less comprehensive than other theories; its focus on subjective experiences may exclude other important clinical considerations; and that it was developed from a North-American perspective and may not be generalizable to other cultures (Cervone & Pervin, 2016). Notwithstanding this latter point, it has shown to be effective with some adjustments in the Islamic state of Qatar (Al-Thani & Moore, 2012), and in Japan (Komiya & Tudor, 2016); and a rigorous analysis of evidence from the 20th and 21st centuries suggests that, with some cultural adaptations, if may be effective across diagnoses, as well as cultures (Quinn, 2012).

Limitations of radical behaviourism include that it omits important phenomena such as vicarious learning and social learning (Funder, 2001); that the theory, although comprehensive, oversimplifies personality (Cervone & Pervin, 2016); and that it mistakenly assumes that determinism implies predictability (Sommerbeck, 2011)

Recent literature makes a compelling case for a more integrated approach between these two theories, that may overcome some of these limitations. Perez-Alvarez & Sass (2009) suggest phenomenology’s focus on subjectivity de-emphasises ‘active processes’ in behaviour change, and that behaviourism’s reinforcers are not just things that follow responses but “also and above all else, values that guide our life”. They make a convincing case for compatibility of phenomenology and behaviourism, and reference Acceptance and Commitment Therapy as an example of a successful integrated approach. Perez-Alvarez (2012) further advances this argument by analysing other “Third-Generation Therapies” (that build on an integration of behaviourism and phenomenology) and finds they are supported by a growing body of empirical evidence. Behavioural Activation for example has shown in major depression to be more effective than cognitive therapy and more advantageous than medication.

Sommerbeck (2011) observes that Rogers was conflicted in supporting determinism on the one hand, and free-will on the other; Skinner’s mistake was assuming that by knowing all the variables, behaviour could be predicted. She makes a coherent argument that newer knowledge of chaos theory and nonlinear dynamic systems—which show that determinism does not necessarily imply predictability, and that even when all variables are controlled, randomness can still occur—provides an opportunity to reconsider both theories and to bridge their positions to a more unified comprehensive approach.

Conclusion

From my review, I find the primary difference is in the determinants of behaviour: phenomenology, by the innate motive to self-actualise; and behaviourism, by responses to environmental stimuli. Despite their different approaches both theories have made significant contributions to psychology.

I suggest a major limitation of both theories is that they are constrained by knowledge and technology of their time. Phenomenology in particular fails to acknowledge the biological bases of human nature. Behavioural genetics has documented “without a shadow of remaining doubt”, that personality is to some degree genetically influenced (Funder, 2001). Radical behaviourism acknowledges genetics and also “inner behaviour” but was constrained by not being able to observe or measure these variables scientifically. Newer knowledge and technology overcomes these limitations to a significant extent. It is now possible, with fMRI and other advances in technology both to observe and measure “inner behaviour”, and to identify to a much more granular level (including to specific genes) variables that influence behaviour (Cervone & Pervin, 2016). Non-linear dynamics provides a solid frame for understanding that even when all variables are controlled, randomness can still occur (Sommerbeck, 2011). I suggest if Skinner and Rogers were alive today, they would indeed be excited by these developments, and they themselves would reconsider the case for an integrated approach.

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